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et al., 2006; Santiago et al., 2007). There is also a rich orientational 
metaphor system in the up/down spatial dimension, which is the 
main concern of this paper. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
some metaphorical notions (good, virtue, happiness, consciousness, 
health, wealth, high status, power, etc.) are mapped onto the “up” 
pole of the vertical dimension, whereas the opposite notions (evil, 
vice, sadness, unconsciousness, illness, poverty, low status, etc) are 
mapped onto the “down” pole of the vertical dimension.
Some recent studies have supported the embodied character of 
up/down conceptual metaphors. Thus, Schubert (2005) has found 
evidence that the concept of power is partially mapped onto the 
physical vertical dimension; in other words, the “control is up – 
lack of control is down” conceptual metaphor is embodied. Thus, 
when participants were asked to judge which one was the more 
powerful of two groups (e.g., master or servant), their response 
was faster if the word for the powerful group was in the upper 
part of the screen than if it was in the lower part. Furthermore, 
Moeller et al. (2008), using a spatial attention paradigm, found 
that individuals with dominant personalities favored the vertical 
dimension of space more than individuals with low dominance, 
being faster to respond to probes along a vertical axis, while both 
groups performed similarly over a horizontal axis.
In the same vein, the “more is up – less is down” orientational 
metaphor was investigated by Joseph et al. (1994), who found that 
participants’ judgments of their performance in a proofreading 
task were influenced by the size of the pile of documents they were 
required to read. Individuals who were required to read pages inside 
journals (high pile) judged that they had done more and a better job 
IntroductIon
People use language to refer literally to perceptual objects or events, 
in sentences such as “the balloon rose.” However, they can also refer 
to abstract events and entities using the indirect pathway of meta-
phors. For example, “his mood rose” expresses the abstract concept 
of “arriving at a good mood” in terms of the more concrete con-
cept of “rising.” In other words, metaphors help us to understand 
abstract or relatively unclear concepts such as mental states in terms 
of concrete sensory-motor experiences. Two related features emerge 
from the current literature on metaphorical meaning: metaphors are 
conceptual, and metaphors are embodied. The conceptual nature of 
metaphors means that metaphorical expressions are tied to meta-
phorical concepts in a systematic way (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 
Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). In other words, concepts are primarily 
metaphorical (rather than symbolic or propositional) and linguis-
tic metaphors are systematically derived from these concepts. On 
the other hand, conceptual metaphors are grounded in embodied 
representations; that is to say, we use sensory-motor experience to 
conceptualize abstract domains such as time, feelings, interper-
sonal relationships, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994, 
2006; Johnson and Lakoff, 2002; Casasanto, 2009). Thus, given the 
prominence of space in our perceptual and motor experience, spatial 
dimensions are frequently used to support rich metaphorical con-
ceptual systems (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For instance, speakers 
of English and other languages have been found to conceptualize 
time by mapping the future in front and the past behind themselves 
(e.g., Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Sell and Kaschak, 2010) or, 
alternatively, the future to the right and the past to the left (Torralbo 
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than those who were asked to read single pages (low pile), despite 
the fact that the two conditions demanded the same amount of 
work. Similarly, Langston (2002) found that texts that violate the 
“more is up-less is down” conceptual metaphor are more difficult 
to comprehend than texts that are consistent with such metaphor, 
yielding slower response times and higher error rates in a semantic 
task. Moreover, Ito and Hatta (2004) reported a SNARC-like effect 
(Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes) for the vertical 
dimension: they found that participants were faster to respond to 
large numbers with the top choice key than with the bottom choice 
key, whereas the reverse was true for small numbers.
Finally, concerning the “positive is up – negative is down” meta-
phor, Meier and Robinson (2004) have reported that evaluations 
for positive words were faster when words were in the upper rather 
than on the lower position in the screen, whereas for negative words 
they found the opposite pattern. They also found that participants 
with higher neuroticism or depressive symptoms responded faster 
to spatial attention targets placed in the bottom, which suggests 
that negative affect biases selective attention in a direction that 
favors lower regions of physical space (Meier and Robinson, 2006). 
Memory tasks are also sensitive to the “positive is up – negative is 
down” metaphor. Thus, Crawford et al. (2006) asked participants 
to remember images with an emotionally positive or negative 
valence, and found that positive items were remembered better 
when presented on the top of the screen, while negative images were 
biased downward. Also Casasanto and Dijkstra (2010) reported that 
participants retrieved more positive memories of their life when 
instructed to move marbles up, and more negative memories when 
instructed to move them down, demonstrating that positive and 
negative life experiences are implicitly associated with schematic 
representations of upward and downward motion.
The above studies investigated how the up/down metaphori-
cal conceptualization modulates different semantic tasks, such as 
semantic classifications in bipolar categories, but they did not directly 
investigate whether the motions in the vertical dimension are acti-
vated online during ordinary comprehension of metaphors. To test 
the embodied meaning approach to language comprehension, some 
researchers have used an action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE) 
paradigm. The basic ACE procedure consists of asking participants to 
listen to or read sentences describing motor events while they perform 
a motor task designed to match or mismatch the meaning of the sen-
tences (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Buccino et al., 2005; Borreggine 
and Kaschak, 2006; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008; 
Kaschak and Borregine, 2008; de Vega et al., in revision). In most 
cases a facilitatory ACE has been reported in the literature; that is, the 
meaning-action matching condition produces faster motor responses 
than the mismatching condition. Thus, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) 
asked people to judge the sensibility of sentences describing a transfer 
motion toward or away from them (e.g., “Andy delivered the pizza to 
you” or “You delivered the pizza to Andy”). The judgment time for sen-
sible sentences was faster for the matching conditions (e.g., sentences 
describing a transfer toward oneself with the “yes” response being a 
hand motion toward oneself) than for the mismatching conditions.
Surprisingly, in spite of the abundant literature on metaphors, 
no study has yet been performed to address whether the compre-
hension of up/down orientational metaphors activates embodied 
representations online. To our knowledge, the only ACE study 
on metaphorical comprehension to date has been run recently to 
demonstrate that the comprehension of “future is in front – past is 
behind” spatial metaphors activates body action simulations in the 
front/back spatial dimension (Sell and Kaschak, 2010). The present 
research aims to fill the gap, testing whether the comprehension 
of up/down metaphors activates vertical body actions or visual 
motions online. Given that orientational metaphors are ubiquitous 
in everyday language, it is possible that they might have become 
“frozen” or “dead;” if such were the case, they would not activate 
embodied representations online. Conversely, if embodied repre-
sentations were part of metaphorical meaning, then they would 
be activated in online comprehension. Moreover, not only would 
explicit orientational metaphors activate embodied representations 
but, as we will argue, abstract literal sentences that describe the same 
conceptual domains as orientational metaphors would also activate 
embodied representations in the same way. Assuming that meta-
phors do activate embodied representations online, another goal of 
this study was to know whether these representations have a motor 
component, a visuo-spatial component, or both. Notice that most 
up/down orientational metaphors employ verbs of motion (e.g., 
rising, going down, falling, jumping, etc), and these motions could 
potentially be understood as visual or motor events. For instance, 
the metaphor “made him rise with victory” could be represented 
either as an upward visual motion (e.g., as watching a movie), as 
an upward body action, or as a combination of the two.
In this research, the ACE procedure was modified to test how ori-
entational metaphors modulate vertical body actions (Experiments 
1 and 2). Participants performed either upward or downward hand 
motions while they read orientational metaphors and other types 
of sentences. If orientational metaphors involved a simulation of 
a vertical action, then they would interact with the enactment of 
a matching body vertical motion. Thus, one might expect faster 
responses in matching as compared to mismatching conditions: up 
metaphors (“climbing up in the company”) would facilitate upward 
hand motions, and down metaphors (“falling into depression”) would 
facilitate downward hand motions. Moreover, given that the con-
ceptual system supposedly is itself metaphoric (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980), the same meaning-action facilitation should be observed with 
literal sentences referring to the same concepts as orientational meta-
phors. For instance, “succeeding in business” would facilitate upward 
hand motions and “becoming sick” would facilitate downward hand 
motions. By contrast, if the ACE were restricted to orientational 
metaphors, this would mean that it might be a lexical phenomenon 
triggered by the motion verb, rather than a conceptual phenomenon.
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to test whether metaphorical 
meaning involves a purely visual motion component. Rather than 
using the ACE paradigm of the previous experiments, participants 
were asked to press a single key in response to either an upward or a 
downward visual animation. In this way, the visual motion matched 
or mismatched the orientational meaning of the sentences, but par-
ticipants did not perform any upward or downward motion. In spite 
of this, it is possible that a visual motion-sentence compatibility effect 
would emerge; namely, we might expect faster responses for match-
ing conditions (e.g., up metaphors and upward visual animation) 
than for mismatching conditions. In fact, some studies have used a 
dual-task paradigm to demonstrate a visual motion-sentence com-
patibility effect. For instance, Kaschak et al. (2005) asked  participants 
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to make semantic judgments on auditory sentences that described 
motions toward them (e.g., “the car approached you”) or away from 
them (e.g., “the horse ran away from you”), while simultaneously 
viewing dynamic stimuli that produced an illusory motion toward or 
away from them. Semantic judgments were faster in the mismatching 
condition than in the matching conditions, suggesting a competition 
for the same neuronal resources responsible for processing a given 
visual motion (e.g., away from you) and processing of the meaning 
sentence. Furthermore, a neuroimaging study observed that during 
the comprehension of visual motion-related sentences, there was 
activation in a brain region responsible for processing dynamic visual 
stimuli (Rueschemeyer et al., 2010).
To test these ideas, three kinds of sentences were created (see 
examples in Table 1). First, literals describing upward or downward 
physical movements were included as a baseline condition, in which 
ordinary ACE should be expected. The second group comprised 
metaphors, including upward motion verbs (e.g., “climbing,” “fly-
ing,” “jumping”), and downward motion verbs (e.g., “falling,” “sink-
ing,” “burying”). Typically, upward metaphors referred to abstract 
positive events like “success,” “gain,” “improvement,” or “happiness,” 
while downward metaphors referred to negative events such as 
“defeat,” “loss,” “worsening,” or “sadness.” The third group, abstract 
sentences referred to similar concepts as the orientational meta-
phors, although in this case employing literal verbs such as “suc-
ceeding,” “improving,” “failing,” or “winning.” While reading the 
critical verb (Table 1, in bold), participants were asked to perform 
a hand motion that either matched or mismatched the direction 
of the motion described by the sentence. The reaction times in the 
matching and mismatching conditions provided the main ACE 
measure. In Experiment 1, the cue prompting the motor response 
was a visual upward or downward animation of the target word. In 
Experiment 2, the cue prompting the motor response was a color 
switch (from black to red or blue) of the target word, with the 
purpose being to observe meaning-action interaction in absence 
of visual motion. In Experiment 3 there was again an upward/
downward animation of the target word, but in this case partici-
pants were not asked to move their hand in these directions. They 
simply performed a go/nogo task: pressing a single key when the 
target word moved and not pressing any key otherwise.
ExpErImEnt 1
In this experiment, the motor responses were cued by an upward/
downward visual animation of the sentence verb, which was eas-
ily interpreted by participants as a prompt to immediately move 
their finger in the same direction. The visual animation was set 
200 ms after the verb onset, because action-verbs more strongly 
activate the motor cortex within this temporal range, according to 
magnetoencephalography studies (e.g., Pulvermüller et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, in a previous study with literal transfer sentences 
de Vega et al. (in revision) found that this interval was optimal to 
obtain ACE. In addition to the motor responses, participants were 
asked to respond to a simple yes/no memory question after reading 
each sentence, providing later measures of meaning-action effects.
The procedure used here was the same as the one employed 
by de Vega et al. (in revision), and differs from the typical ACE 
studies (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008) 
in which the directional motor responses were associated with 
sensibility judgments and were collected after understanding the 
whole sentence. By contrast, here the motor action was a simple 
psychophysical response to a visual cue, and did not require the 
burden of a semantic judgment. The procedure allows collecting 
meaning-action effects at a relatively early stage of sentence process-
ing (in the verb), and also dissociating the motor effects (measured 
on the motor response) from the semantic effects (measured on 
the memory task).
mEthod
partIcIpants
Sixty students of Psychology of the University of La Laguna, all 
native speakers of Spanish, took part in the experiment in exchange 
for academic credits.
Table 1 | Examples of the original Spanish materials, and their English 
translation.
Upward literal El gas/a presión/hizo/elevarse/al globo
 ¿Se elevó una cometa?
 The pressured gas made the balloon rise
 Was it a kite what rose?
Downward literal El peso/de los lastres/permitió/descender/al buzo
 ¿Descendió el buzo?
 The ballast’s weight made the diver sink
 Did the diver sink?
Upward metaphor Su talento/para la política/le hizo/alzarse/
 con la victoria.
 ¿Se alzó con la victoria?
 His talent for politics made him rise to victory
 Did he rise to victory?
Downward metaphor Su despido/de la empresa/le hizo/caer/
 en una depresión
 ¿Fue despedido de la empresa?
 Being fired from the company made him
 fall into depression
 Was he fired from the company?
Upward abstract Su capacidad/de trabajo/le hizo/triunfar/
 como profesional
 ¿Era incapaz para el trabajo?
 His working capability made him succeed
 as a professional
 Was he incapable for work?
Downward abstract Las peleas/con su pareja/hicieron/fracasar/
 su matrimonio
 ¿Peleaba con suvecino?
 The fights with his couple made his marriage fail
 Did he fight with his neighbor?
Filler El camión/de reparto/se encontraba/junto
 a la puerta
 ¿El camión era de mudanzas?
 The delivery van was near the door
 Was it a delivery van?
Each the words between two slashes (/) correspond to a given self-paced 
segment of text. The verb associated with the motor response is in bold. A 
memory question follows each sentence.
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key and move their dominant hand’s index finger to press the key 
either above or below it. After the motor response, the final seg-
ment was presented, and remained 800 ms in the screen. Finally, 
a memory question referring to the sentence was given, and par-
ticipants responded yes or no by using one of the two keys of the 
mouse with their non-dominant hand. The practice trials were 
similar to the experimental ones, except that the former were fol-
lowed by motor response feedback.
rEsults
Four participants were discarded from the analyses because they 
gave more than 10% wrong responses in the memory task. The 
average error rate for the motor response was very small (less than 
1%). Outliers exceeding the mean reaction times by two SDs were 
also excluded from the analyses (4.2% of data). Several measures 
were collected for analysis. The releasing time (from the anima-
tion onset to the release of the resting key) and the key-pressing 
time (from the release to the pressing of one directional key) are 
components of the same response, and so we decided to use the 
sum of the two as a single dependent measure, which we called 
motor response time. We also analyzed the time and accuracy of the 
responses to the memory questions. Repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) including Sentence type, Semantic direction, 
and Motor direction were performed for each of the above depend-
ent measures, both by item (F
1
) and by participant (F
2
). Additional 
Semantic direction × Motor direction ANOVAs were also run for 
each Sentence type separately, as well as t-tests between pairs of 
conditions sharing the same directional motor response. We will 
only report significant effects.
motor rEsponsE tImEs
There was a main effect of Motor direction: [F
1
(1, 55) = 40.188, 
MSe = 86877.74; F
2
(1, 90) = 9.15, MSe = 19773.01, p ≤ 0.0001]; 
specifically, downward responses were faster (M = 749 ms) than 
upward responses (M = 785 ms). However, this effect was modu-
lated by the important Motor direction × Semantic direction 
interaction: F
1
(1, 55) = 21.79, MSe = 87347.48, p ≤ 0.000; F
2
(1, 
90) = 9.15, MSe = 19773.01, p ≤ 0.003. This interaction consists 
of a matching < mismatching pattern, as shown in Figure 1. 
Moreover, the Motor direction × Semantic direction interaction 
was significant for each type of sentence analyzed separately: liter-
als [F
1
(1, 55) = 4.58; MSe = 4798.17, p ≤ 0.037; F
2
(1, 30) = 2.13, 
n.s.], metaphors [F
1
(1, 55) = 10.63; MSe = 4090.46, p ≤ 0.002; F
2
(1, 
30) = 6.62, MSe = 2444.53, p ≤ 0.015], and abstract sentences [F
1
(1, 
55) = 6.99; MSe = 3438.67, p ≤ 0.01; F
2
(1, 30) = 1.70, n.s.], indi-
cating that the matching < mismatching pattern was shared by 
the three types of sentences. Further t-tests performed for each 
pair of matching-mismatching conditions revealed significant 
effects both for upward [t(55) = 2.38, p ≤ 0.021] and downward 
[t(55) = 2.60, p ≤ 0.012] motor response in metaphors; for upward 
motor responses [t(55) = 2.181, p ≤ 0.033] in abstract sentences, and 
for upward motor responses [t(55) = 2.332, p ≤ 0.023] in literals.
rEsponsE tImEs In thE mEmory task
The most important result was the significant Semantic direc-
tion × Motor direction interaction [F
1
(1, 55) = 3.83, MSe = 284478.48, 
p ≤ 0.05; F
2
(1, 90) = 19.19, MSe = 14988.06, p ≤ 0.0001]. This  interaction 
matErIals
Ninety-six experimental sentences (32 literals, 32 metaphors, and 
32 abstract sentences) were constructed, as well as 50 filler sen-
tences, describing static scenarios (e.g.: The delivery van was near 
the door), and eight practice sentences. The experimental and 
the sample sentences, illustrated in Table 1, shared the following 
structure: Subject/noun complement/verbal periphrasis/main verb/
verb complement. The main verb, which described an upward or 
downward motion or an abstract event, was always the fourth seg-
ment. All five segments had approximately the same number of 
words in each sentence: 2 in the first one, 2 or 3 in the second and 
fifth and 1 or 2 in the third and fourth, depending on the particular 
periphrasis. This periphrastic structure was not suitable for the 
filler sentences, which described static situations. As a result, the 
filler sentences had four segments and the critical verb was placed 
in the third position. Finally, each sentence had a corresponding 
yes/no question that could refer to any segment.
dEsIgn and procEdurE
The experiment manipulated 3 sentence types (literals, metaphors, 
and abstract sentences) × 2 Motor direction (upward, down-
ward) × 2 Semantic directions (upward, downward) in a factorial 
within-participant design. The experimental session started with 
instructions to perform the task, followed by eight practice trials 
similar to the experimental ones, and finally the 96 experimental 
trials mixed with the 50 fillers were presented randomly in two 
blocks. The experimental trials included eight sentences for each of 
the 12 experimental conditions resulting from the combination of 
the three factors: upward literal-upward motor, upward metaphor-
upward motor, upward abstract-upward motor, downward literal-
upward motor, downward metaphor-upward motor, downward 
abstract-upward motor, upward literal-downward motor, upward 
metaphor-downward motor, upward abstract-downward motor, 
downward literal-downward motor, downward metaphor-down-
ward motor, downward abstract-downward motor. There were two 
counter-balanced conditions, in which the assignment of motor 
direction to trials was reversed.
An ordinary computer keyboard was used for the recording of 
motor responses. The keyboard was fixed in an upright position, 
remaining thus during the whole experimental session, with all 
keys removed except the letters A, G, and L, which were placed 
in a downward, central, and upward position, respectively. Their 
distances to the table surface were 10, 18, and 26 cm, respectively. 
Upward and downward keys were covered by a 5-mm red square 
with icon arrows of the corresponding directions. A set of concen-
tric circles, like a small target, covered the central (resting) key. The 
rest of the keyboard was covered with white cardboard. Participants 
were seated in front of the computer screen, with their elbows rest-
ing on the table, and were instructed to use the response keyboard 
with their dominant hand, and the mouse with the other.
The experimental trials consisted of the following sequence: a 
fixation point in the middle of the screen prompted participants 
to press the resting key and keep it pressed while the first three 
segments appeared automatically in the screen, remaining 800 ms 
each. Then, the fourth segment with the critical verb appeared and 
remained 200 ms, before “jumping” upward or downward. This 
apparent motion was a cue for participants to release the resting 
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Errors In thE mEmory task
The mean percentages of errors are shown in Table 2. The ANOVA 
revealed a Semantic direction × Motor direction interaction [F
1
(1, 
55) = 5.64, MSe = 58.53, p ≤ 0.021], consisting of smaller number 
of errors for matching than for mismatching conditions. Separate 
analyses performed for each sentence type only confirmed a signifi-
cant Semantic direction × Motor direction interaction for metaphors 
[F
1
(1, 55) = 9.78, MSe = 59.44, p ≤ 0.003]. The t-tests confirmed 
statistically significant differences for upward [t(55) = 2.63, p ≤ 0.01] 
and downward motor responses [t(55) = 2.12, p ≤ 0.04] in metaphors.
dIscussIon
Using a double task paradigm, Experiment 1 obtained robust ACE. 
Several facts are remarkable in the results. First, the ACE consists 
of the standard pattern observed in other studies: the matching 
conditions resulted in a better performance than the mismatch-
ing conditions, confirming that the reading of the experimental 
was significant for literals [F
1
(1, 55) = 6.07, MSe = 17154.01, p < 0.02; 
F
2
(1, 30) = 11.22, MSe = 14821.93, p ≤ 0.002], and for abstract 
sentences [F
2
(1, 30) = 6.63, MSe = 8353.65, p ≤ 0.016] showing the 
matching < mismatching pattern. The t-tests confirmed this pattern 
for upward motor direction [t(55) = 3.48, p ≤ 0.0001] in metaphors, 
for downward motor direction [t(55) = 2.08, p ≤ 0.042] in abstract 
sentences, and for both upward [t(55) = 3.58, p ≤ 0.001] and down-
ward [t(55) = 2.08, p ≤ 0.042] motor direction in literals. These 
results are shown in Table 2.
Other results with less theoretical interest for this paper 
were the main effect of Sentence type [F
1
(2, 110) = 17.77, 
MSe = 20289.54, p ≤ 0.0001], as abstract sentences produced faster 
responses (M = 1342) than metaphors (M = 1404), and literals 
(M = 1404). This effect, however, was modulated by the Sentence 
type × Semantic direction [F
1
(2, 110) = 9.122, MSe = 195866.86, 
p ≤ 0.0001] and by the Sentence type × Motor direction [F
1
(2, 
110) = 6.15, MSe = 582186.81, p ≤ 0.01].
FigurE 1 | Experiment 1: Mean of motor responses times, as a function of Sentence type, Sentence direction, and Motor direction. The vertical lines 
indicate the SDs, and the stars (*) correspond to significant matching-mismatching pairwise comparisons (p < 0.05).
Table 2 | Experiment 1. Mean response times (in ms) in the memory task, and mean percent errors.
 Sentence type
 Literals Metaphors Abstract sentences
Motor Semantic Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%)
Upward Upward 1312 (315) 3.2 (6.4) 1394 (304) 4.1 (6.2) 1365 (255) 4.1 (7)
 Downward 1382 (312) 4.3 (7.6) 1492 (307) 7.2 (9) 1362 (267) 4.1 (6.7)
 ACE 70** 1.1 98** 3.1* −3 0
Downward Upward 1486 (294) 5 (7.7) 1359 (317) 6.6 (9.5) 1348 (275) 4.8 (8.7)
 Downward 1436 (314) 5.5 (10) 1371 (322) 3.2 (5.9) 1294 (273) 3.4 (6)
 ACE 50* −0.5 −12 3.4* 54* 1.4
SDs are in parenthesis. ACE = mismatching condition – matching condition. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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word appeared in black and after 200 ms it turned blue or red 
and remained so until the participant’s response. For half of the 
participants the red color was a cue to move their hand upward, 
and the blue color was a cue to downward hand movement, while 
for the remaining participants the assignment of colors to direc-
tions was reversed. Given the novelty of the color response cues, 
participants received 40 training trials to learn how to use the motor 
response system, at the beginning of the session, before the prac-
tice and the experimental trials. Each training item mimicked the 
events sequence of the experimental trials, except that each visual 
segment consisted of sets of pseudowords rather than words and, 
consequently, there were not comprehension questions.
The response keyboard was arranged vertically as in Experiment 
1, and the keys assigned to the upward or downward direction were 
covered with the assigned red or blue colors. The resting key was 
covered with concentric circles like a small target. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to one of the four counterbalancing condi-
tions, resulting from changing the motor direction and color assig-
nation. Each of the counterbalancing conditions of Experiment 
1, thus, produced two conditions in Experiment 2: “red-up, blue-
down” and “red-down, blue-up.”
rEsults
One participant was excluded from analyses for giving more than 
10% wrong responses on the memory task. Outliers were also dis-
carded, following the same trimming criteria as in Experiment 1. 
ANOVAS for motor response times (releasing time + key-pressing 
time) and for semantic response times and accuracy were con-
ducted by participants (F
1
) and by items (F
2
).
motor rEsponsE tImEs
There was a main effect of Motor direction, consisting of faster 
responses for the downward than for the upward direction: F
2
(1, 
90) = 18.29, MSe = 1771.88, p ≤ 0.0001. However, this effect was 
modulated by the important Motor direction × Semantic direc-
tion interaction: F
1
(1, 35) = 28.18, MSe = 7942.08, p ≤ 0.0001; 
F
2
(1, 90) = 54.48, MSe = 1771.88, p ≤ 0.0001. This interaction 
consisted of the matching < mismatching pattern observed in the 
previous experiment (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the Motor direc-
tion × Semantic direction interaction was also significant for each 
of the sentences types analyzed separately: literals: F
1
(1, 35) = 10.75, 
MSe = 5401.41, p ≤ 0.02; F
2
(1, 30) = 17.30, MSe = 22351.15, 
p ≤ 0.0001; metaphors: F
1
(1, 35) = 27.43, MSe = 5982.05, p ≤ 0.0001; 
F
2
(1, 30) = 38.12, MSe = 65440.09, p ≤ 0.0001; and abstract sen-
tences: F
1
(1, 35) = 6.65, MSe = 4514.99, p ≤ 0.014; F
2
(1, 30) = 7.65, 
MSe = 17644.88, p ≤ 0.010. The t-test pairwise comparisons con-
firmed the matching < mismatching pattern both for upward 
[t(35) = 2.54, p ≤ 0.016] and downward [t(35) = 3.67, p ≤ 0.0001] 
motor direction in metaphors, and only for downward motor 
responses in abstract sentences [t(35) = 2.44, p ≤ 0.019] and in 
literals [t(35) = 3.86, p ≤ 0.0001].
rEsponsE tImEs In thE mEmory task
A main effect of Sentence types was observed: F
1
(2, 70) = 9.91, 
MSe = 22570.52, p ≤ 0.0001, consisting of faster responses for 
abstract sentences (M = 1270) than for metaphors (M = 1328), and 
for literals (M = 1345). However, the most important result was 
sentences activates embodied representations of vertical motions 
online. Second, the meaning-action effects were observed in two 
different moments, modulating the speed of the finger motion task 
that immediately followed the sentence verb, as well as the speed 
and accuracy of the memory task recorded at the end of sentence. 
This fact suggests a symmetric meaning-action modulation, as 
will be argued in the general discussion. In other words, not only 
does the sentence meaning modulate the performance of a motor 
action, but the motor action also modulates the comprehension 
of the sentence. Third, the ACE was obtained in all three types 
of sentences: in literal sentences describing upward/downward 
motions, in metaphors and even in abstract sentences that shared 
meaning with metaphors, indicating that the effects were not spe-
cifically associated with the action-verbs, but with the metaphori-
cal domain underlying these sentences. Interestingly, the ACE was 
apparently more conspicuous in metaphors (significant both for 
upward and downward movements) than in the other types of 
sentences (only significant for upward movements), although the 
sentence type × motor direction × semantic direction interaction 
was not significant [F(1, 55) < 1].
ExpErImEnt 2
Experiment 1 confirmed our predictions for meaning-action effects, 
supporting the embodied cognition approach to metaphorical mean-
ing. Moreover, the activation of embodied representations was found 
to occur online while participants were reading the sentence verb 
and extended to the end of sentence. Notice, however, that an appar-
ent motion of the sentence verb cued the upward/downward finger 
motion in the same direction. Consequently, there was a possible 
confusion between the visual motion effects and the motor response 
effects. The apparent motion might produce a compatibility effect 
itself, indistinguishable from the meaning-action interaction. In 
this respect, some papers have reported that the apparent motion 
of visual stimuli could affect the comprehension of a simultaneous 
sentence with a meaning matching or mismatching the direction of 
the visual motion (e.g., Kaschak et al., 2005). To avoid this confusion, 
in Experiment 2 the upward/downward finger motion was prompted 
by a color change of the critical verb, rather than its apparent motion. 
This ensured that the static visual cue could not produce any com-
patibility effect itself, and the obtained effects, if any, could only be 
attributed to the meaning-action compatibility.
mEthod
partIcIpants
Thirty-seven native Spanish-speaking undergraduates took part, 
in exchange for academic credits.
matErIals, dEsIgn, and procEdurE
The experimental sentences and their distribution in the experi-
mental session were the same as in Experiment 1. The design was 
exactly the same than in the previous experiment: a 3 Sentence 
type × 2 Motor direction × 2 Semantic direction repeated measures 
factorial design. The procedure was also the same, except that in 
this case the target word did not move, but rather changed its color 
as a prompt to move the hand upward or downward. Thus, the 
first three segments were presented in black, each lasting 800 ms, 
while participants kept the resting key pressed. Then the target 
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dIscussIon
In Experiment 2 the visual motion was removed from the task, 
whereas the vertical hand motion was preserved. In spite of this, 
the meaning-action effects were virtually the same as in the previ-
ous experiment. The matching < mismatching pattern was found 
in the motor response times for all three sentence types: literals, 
metaphors, and abstract sentences. Again metaphors showed sig-
nificant ACE both for upward and downward movements, whereas 
the abstract and literal sentences only showed ACE for downward 
movements. It was also observed in the responses times to the 
memory questions, but only for abstract sentences. Thus, we can 
conclude that there is a genuine ACE in metaphorical meaning, 
which is independent of visual motion. The next experiment will 
test the role of visual motion alone when the directional hand 
motion is suppressed.
once again the significant Motor direction × Semantic direction 
interaction, illustrated in Table 3: F
1
(1, 35) = 5.01, MSe = 19302.44, 
p ≤ 0.032; F
2
(1, 90) = 6.24, MSe = 7241.86, p ≤ 0.014. When each 
sentence type was analyzed separately, the matching < mismatch-
ing pattern was only confirmed for abstract sentences (see Table 3): 
Motor direction × Semantic direction interaction F
1
(1, 35) = 8.24, 
MSe = 16187.65, p ≤ 0.007; F
2
(1, 30) = 6.71, MSe = 52970.06, 
p ≤ 0.015. The t-tests confirmed a significant effect for upward 
motor responses [t(35) = 3.16, p ≤ 0.003].
Errors In thE mEmory task
Error analyses only showed a main effect of Sentence type F
1
(2, 
70) = 3.67, MSe = 0.006, p ≤ 0.031. Specifically, literals produced 
fewer errors (M = 2.5%) than metaphors (M = 4.75%) and abstract 
sentences (M = 5%).
FigurE 2 | Experiment 2: Mean of motor responses times as a function of Sentence type, Sentence direction, and Motor direction. The vertical lines indicate 
the SDs, and the stars (*) correspond to significant matching-mismatching pairwise comparisons (p < 0.05).
Table 3 | Experiment 2. Mean response times (in ms) in the memory task, and mean percent errors.
 Sentence type
 Literals Metaphors Abstract sentences
Motor Semantic Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%)
Upward Upward 1356 (292) 3.3 (6.5) 1305 (348) 4.9 (7.1) 1217 (243) 5.1 (7.3)
 Downward 1326 (342) 1.8 (5.3) 1318 (320) 4.3 (8.8) 1307 (262) 2.6 (5.3)
 ACE −30 −1.5 13 −0.6 90** −2.5
Downward Upward 1379 (310) 2.4 (5.1) 1354 (346) 5.2 (5.8) 1295 (299) 6.1 (1.0)
 Downward 1321 (330) 3.1 (6.8) 1338 (304) 4.6 (9.0) 1263 (261) 5.6 (8.1)
 ACE 58 −0.7 16 0.6 32 0.5
SDs are in parenthesis. ACE = mismatching condition – matching condition. **p < 0.01.
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rEsponsE tImEs In thE mEmory task
A main effect of Sentence type F
1
(2, 64) = 9.12, MSe = 31528.34, 
p ≤ 0.0001 was found (literals M = 1429; metaphors M = 1388; 
abstract sentences M = 1337). However, this was qualified by a tri-
ple Sentence type × Visual direction × Semantic direction interac-
tion: F
1
(1, 32) = 5.03, MSe = 35315.13, p ≤ 0.032; F
2
(2, 90) = 3.50. 
MSe = 1501.09, p ≤ 0.034. In the simple effects analysis there was 
only a significant Visual direction × Semantic direction for meta-
phors: F
1
(1, 32) = 6.023, MSe = 49825.58, p ≤ 0.02; F
2
(1, 30) = 10.37, 
MSe = 151469.77, p ≤ 0.003. This interaction consists of a match-
ing < mismatching pattern (see Table 5), which was most remark-
able for upward motor responses [t(32) = 3.80, p ≤ 0.001].
Errors In thE mEmory task
Error analyses only revealed a main effect of Visual direction F
1
(1, 
32) = 14.42, MSe = 0.006, p ≤ 0.001 resulting from higher error 
rates for downward visual directions.
dIscussIon
Experiment 3 did not show the robust and general match-
ing < mismatching pattern obtained in the previous experiments. 
The motor reaction times in the go trials were not sensitive either 
to the  semantic direction implicit in the sentences, or to the visual 
direction of the animation, or to the interaction between the two. 
In other words, none of the sentence types showed meaning-
motion compatibility effects in the motor response. Concerning 
the response times to the memory questions, there was a sig-
nificant meaning-motion interaction confined to metaphors. 
This interaction, which involves the usual matching advantage, 
is rather surprising because it was not observed in the motor 
responses themselves but it was delayed until the memory task. 
In other words, the mismatching of the sentence meaning and 
the visual animation interferes with sentence comprehension, but 
only for metaphors. Combining the results of this experiment with 
those of the previous ones, we may conclude that visual motion 
is a less important component of metaphorical conceptualiza-
tion than motor motion. This is an apparent limitation to the 
hypothesis that metaphors are grounded on sensory-motor proc-
esses. The current literature on embodied meaning indicates that 
activations could be multimodal; that is, not only motor traces, 
ExpErImEnt 3
The previous experiment demonstrated that the meaning-action 
interaction persisted after the influence of visual motion was ruled 
out. In this experiment, we tested whether the visual motion com-
ponent alone interacts with the sentences meaning. To do that, we 
suppressed the directional motor response while keeping the vertical 
visual motion, in a go/nogo paradigm: the participants’ task was 
to press a single key only if the critical verb had moved regardless 
of the direction of its motion. If the response times were faster in 
the meaning-motion matching conditions than in the mismatching 
conditions, we might conclude that the activation of a visual motion 
(not only a motor motion) is associated with the sentence’s meaning.
mEthod
partIcIpants
Thirty-four native Spanish-speaking undergraduates took part in 
the experiment voluntarily, in exchange for academic credits.
matErIals, dEsIgn, and procEdurE
This experiment employed the same experimental sentences and fillers 
(static scenarios) as in Experiment 1 and 2 were employed. In addition, 
24 experimental-like fillers (eight literals, eight metaphors, and eight 
abstract sentences) were created for this experiment. The experimental 
task and procedure, however, differed considerably from those used 
in the previous experiments, because in this experiment the motor 
task always consisted of the same key-pressing motion, without any 
vertical displacement of the hand. Participants were instructed to press 
the key (go trials) when the critical verb moved upward or downward, 
and to refrain from pressing the key otherwise (nogo trials). All of 
the experimental trials (96), and half of the static scenario fillers (25) 
were go trials. The remaining static scenario fillers (25), and all of 
the experimental-like fillers (24) were nogo trials. The experimental 
design was similar to the one used in the previous experiments, except 
that, as explained above, Visual direction substituted Motor direction. 
Thus, a 3 Sentence types × 2 Visual direction × 2 Semantic direction 
repeated measures factorial design was employed.
As in the previous experiments, each trial started with a fixation 
point in the middle of the screen, following which the sentence 
was presented automatically in three segments that remained vis-
ible for 800 ms each. In the go trials, the fourth segment, which 
contained the critical verb, “jumped” up or down 200 ms after its 
onset. This apparent motion was a cue for pressing the key (the 
spacebar in the keyboard) with the participants’ dominant hand; 
after the participant’s response the final segment was presented 
for another 800 ms. Finally, the yes/no question was given, and 
participants were required to answer using the mouse with their 
non-dominant hand.
rEsults
One participant was discarded from the analyses because she did not 
produce any motor response. Outlying data were also excluded, fol-
lowing the same trimming criteria as in Experiment 1 (4.1% of data).
motor rEsponsE tImEs
Only a significant Sentence type × Semantic direction was found 
F
1
(2, 64) = 3.54, MSe = 1766.02, p ≤ 0.035. t-Tests between pairs 
of conditions did not show any significant difference (see Table 4).
Table 4 | Experiment 3. Motor response times (in ms) and SDs.
 Sentence type
 Literals Metaphors Abstract 
   sentences
Visual Semantic Time (ms) Time (ms) Time (ms)
Upward Upward 448 (128) 445 (116) 465 (123)
 Downward 454 (136) 460 (127) 452 (120)
 VCE 6 15 −13
Downward Upward 466 (127) 442 (147) 461 (134)
 Downward 456 (115) 460 (121) 453 (125)
 VCE 10 −18 8
VCE (visual compatibility effect) = mismatching condition – matching condition.
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the phrase “…made him rise to victory” activate an upward body 
action? Even assuming, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) did, that some 
metaphorical concepts are organized along the up/down axis, they 
could involve just a visual motion or even a static position on the 
up/down axis. Lakoff and Johnson seem to think of static up/down 
organization of metaphorical domains rather than up/down body 
motions when they say: “happy is up; sad is down,” or “good is up; 
bad is up,” “power is up;” etc.
One possible explanation for the motoric component of meta-
phors (and homologous literals) is that most refer to human char-
acters that reach an upward or downward state as a consequence 
of their own actions, rather than being passively taken there by 
external uncontrolled forces. A more substantial explanation is that 
most up and down metaphors (and homologous literals) convey 
positive and negative emotional valences, respectively, and emo-
tional valences, on their side, could be associated with vertical body 
actions and postures. According to Darwin’s (1872/1998) evolu-
tionary approach, communication of emotion by body movements 
occupies a privileged position as emotions embody action schemes 
that have evolved in the service of survival. Partial empirical sup-
port to this idea comes from the field of bodily expressions of 
emotions. For instance, the expressions of joy and proud involve 
sometimes upward body movements, whereas the expressions of 
sadness and disgust are more closely associated with downward 
body actions or postures (e.g., Wallbott, 1998; Atkinson et al., 
2004). If so, it could be possible that up metaphors elicit upward 
body movements, because of their positive valence; and down 
metaphors elicit downward body movements, as a consequence of 
their negative valence. In sum, we could tentatively posit that up/
down metaphors are grounded on bodily emotional expressions, 
providing thus a biological explanation of metaphors origins. 
However, this claim requires additional research that is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Meanwhile, caution is necessary before 
carrying conclusions too far. Bodily expressions of positive and 
negative emotions are rather complex and do not solely rely upon 
the vertical dimension. More frequently it has been reported that 
positive/negative stimuli automatically trigger approach/avoid-
ance movements (e.g., Chen and Bargh, 1999; Wentura et al., 
2000; Rotteveel and Phaf, 2004; Rinck and Becker, 2007), which 
clearly differ from the upward/downward movements observed 
here for metaphors.
but also visual and other modalities traces could be activated in 
comprehension (e.g., Kaschak et al., 2005; Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Glenberg et al., 2008; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010). One possibil-
ity, however, is that the visual motion stimuli used here for each 
trial (a single up or down hand motion) were too weak to pro-
duce effects on the concurrent comprehension task. Compare, 
for instance, this procedure with Kaschak et al.’s (2005) study, in 
which they obtained the expected meaning-motion effects for 
literal sentences presenting to the participants a continuous visual 
apparent motion during 35 s, while they listened to and judged 
the sensibility of motion-related sentences. Further research will 
be necessary before taking definite conclusions on the role of 
visual motion in metaphorical meaning.
gEnEral dIscussIon
In this study, the participants’ task was simply to read sentences 
for comprehension without making any bipolar categorical judg-
ments. Consequently, the observed effects demonstrated that 
ordinary comprehension of up/down metaphors or equivalent 
abstract sentences elicited body motions along the vertical axis 
(Experiments 1 and 2). By contrast, the role of a visual motion 
component associated with the comprehension of these sentences 
was less clear, except for the delayed effect obtained with meta-
phors (Experiment 3). The body movement along the up/down 
axis, not the perceptual movement, was thus critical to the repre-
sentation of metaphorical meaning. This is consistent with similar 
observations in the comprehension of “time as space” metaphors. 
Thus, Sell and Kaschak (2010) found that participants were faster 
to respond to future time shifts (e.g., “Tomorrow she will learn 
about paint brushes”) when performing motions away from their 
body, and faster to respond to past time shifts (e.g., “Yesterday she 
learned about paint brushes”) when performing motions toward 
their body. However, in another version of the task participants 
were asked to respond without any hand motion (the finger was 
always ready on the appropriate response key) and the meaning-
action effect disappeared. The action component in “time as space” 
metaphors derives from the fact that time, quantity, and actions in 
the peripersonal space are correlated in human experience, and even 
share brain mechanisms (Walsh, 2003; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 
2008). However, the correspondence between meaning and action 
in up/down metaphors obtained here is less obvious. Why should 
Table 5 | Experiment 3. Mean response times (in ms) in the memory task, and mean percentage errors.
 Sentence type
 Literals Metaphors Abstract sentences
Visual Semantic Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%) Time (ms) Errors (%)
Upward Upward 1425 (392) 3.4 (1.8) 1314 (347) 3.0 (1.7) 1353 (453) 4.5 (2.1)
 Downward 1389 (366) 8.3 (2.7) 1455 (454) 6.4 (2.4) 1340 (435) 4.2 (2.0)
 VCE −36 4.9 141** 3.4 −13 −0.3
Downward Upward 1460 (519) 7.2 (2.6) 1439 (520) 7.9 (2.7) 1339 (368) 7.2 (2.6)
 Downward 1441 (420) 3.1 (1.3) 1389 (348) 7.5 (2.6) 1316 (291) 6.5 (2.9)
 VCE 19 4.1 50 0.4 23 0.7
SDs are in parenthesis. VCE = mismatching condition – matching condition. **p < 0.01.
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sion of the sentence. In other words, the two ACEs support the 
idea of a mutual influence between the meaning of orientational 
sentences and the corresponding actions. These two-way effects 
in orientational sentences depart from other spatial metaphors. 
Particularly, temporal metaphors are asymmetric: the represen-
tation of time is modulated by spatial information, whereas the 
representation of space is not modulated by temporal informa-
tion (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; 
Merritt et al., 2010).
The meaning-action effects obtained here were remarkably 
similar for the three types of sentences, indicating that all are 
grounded on embodied representations. Let’s consider first the 
literal sentences that provide a baseline condition. Basically, the 
results for literal orientational sentences confirm other ACEs 
reported in the literature, supporting the idea that the comprehen-
sion of concrete motion-related language activates sensory-motor 
representations (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Buccino et al., 2005; 
Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
the ACE obtained for metaphors clearly shows that the abstract 
meaning of these sentences also activates sensory-motor repre-
sentations of vertical motions. The metaphors employed in this 
study represent a broad sample of typical metaphors, referring 
to abstract events such as changes in mood, power, status, health, 
wealth, etc. However, metaphors as those used in this study are a 
sort of concrete-abstract hybrid, because their “tenor” or meaning 
is abstract whereas their “vehicle” includes concrete words, such 
as the motion verbs employed in this study. It is possible that the 
ACE obtained here was simply a lexically-driven phenomenon 
associated with the processing of motion verbs. However, we must 
remember that one important claim of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
was that metaphors are not just linguistic expressions, but con-
ceptualizations. The strongest test of the notion of conceptual 
metaphors comes from the results observed here with abstract 
sentences, in which action and motion verbs were absent. We 
can consider these sentences as literal descriptions of underly-
ing orientational concepts; for instance, “succeeding” is a literal 
expression corresponding to the “good is up” conceptual meta-
phor, and “failing” is a literal expression of the “bad is down” 
conceptual metaphor. With this assumption in mind we selected 
for the experiments literal sentences belonging to either the up 
or down pole of the orientational metaphorical system. When 
the upward/downward codes for abstract sentences were entered 
in the statistical analysis we obtained exactly the same meaning-
action matching advantage as for the other sentences. This result 
supports the strong argument that metaphors are not just “nice 
sentences” but rather expressions of a deeper conceptual organi-
zation that not only underlies metaphorical utterances but also 
penetrates literal language. In other words, bipolar notions such as 
power-lack of power, health-sickness, good-bad, success-failure, 
and the like are primarily conceptualized as upward-downward 
body actions. This metaphorical conceptualization determines 
the emergence and use of many up/down metaphorical expres-
sions in English and other languages, but even when we use literal 
sentences to express ideas of a metaphorical domain vertical body 
actions are activated, suggesting that the mapping occurs between 
concepts and actions rather than between action-related words 
and actions.
The current results are also comparable to those reported by 
Wilson and Gibbs (2007) supporting embodied meaning activa-
tion during the comprehension of action-related metaphors. They 
found that performing or imagining a body motion appropriate 
to the metaphorical sentences improved their comprehension. 
Thus, participants were faster to read “grasp a concept” after they 
had previously made or imagined making a grasping movement, 
than after first making a mismatching body action or no move-
ment at all. However, the present study differs from Wilson and 
Gibbs’s one (hereinafter W&G) in important respects. First, the 
effects observed by W&G consisted of action-meaning priming, 
whereas the current ACE was meaning-action priming. W&G used 
the body action as an antecedent event that influenced metaphor 
comprehension; consequently they conclude: “appropriate body 
action enhances people’s embodied, metaphorical construal of 
abstract concepts that are referred to in metaphorical phrases” (p. 
721). By contrast, in our ACE’s experiments metaphor comprehen-
sion occurred first and influenced a motor event that followed. 
Consequently, our conclusion differs from that arrived at by W&G: 
processing the meaning of up/down metaphors (and homologous 
literals) involves an unprimed motor activation that modifies the 
performance of a following physical action. Second, W&G used 
specific actions (grasping, pushing, chewing, etc) as primes for 
metaphorical phrases, and therefore their action-meaning priming 
could force the activation of specific motor programs. By contrast, 
in our experiments the actions referred to by the sentences and the 
body action only shared the up/down directional feature. Thus, the 
sentences varied considerably in the sensory-motor features of the 
vertical motions being referred to (compare “falling sick” and “bury-
ing hopes”), whereas the requested body action was always a simple 
upward/downward finger motion. In spite of that, meaning-action 
interaction occurred. This suggests that actions are simulated at a 
relatively abstract level of motor processing (e.g., gross directional 
parameters) rather than in detail, e.g., at the level of specific motor 
programs. The relatively “abstract” character of motor simulations 
was also observed in other ACE studies involving sentences refer-
ring to concrete actions with different effectors (“throwing a stone” 
vs “kicking a football”) and even abstract events like information 
transfer (“telling the story”), and in all cases the ACE with a concur-
rent away/toward hand motion occurred (Glenberg and Kaschak, 
2002; Glenberg et al., 2008).
In the traditional ACE paradigm the motor response was asso-
ciated with a semantic task, such as a sensibility judgment gener-
ally placed at the end of a sentence (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 
2002; Borreggine and Kaschak, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008; Sell 
and Kaschak, 2010). By contrast, the procedure used here allowed 
for the testing of meaning-action effects at two different loci, 
dissociating the motor response task from the memory task. 
The motor task immediately followed the motion verb provid-
ing a first glance at early meaning-action effects, whereas the 
memory task placed at the end of the sentence showed long-term 
meaning-action effects. Furthermore, the two meaning-action 
effects might have different theoretical value. As mentioned 
above, the ACE in the motor task indicates that the sentence 
meaning modulates a subsequent body action. By contrast, the 
ACE in the memory task might offer information on the reversed 
process: how a previous body action modulates the comprehen-
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